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Panel – Arm’s-Length Governance: Accountability, Performance and 
Change 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONS, FUNCTIONS AND SPACES: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND 
THE CHANGING SHAPE OF ENGLISH GOVERNANCE 
 
Chris Skelcher, Katherine Tonkiss (both University of Birmingham), 
Matthew Flinders and Katharine Dommett (both University of Sheffield) 
 
 
 
This paper draws on the institutional logics approach to analyse the reform of arm’s 
length public bodies (‘quangos’) by the UK’s Coalition government.  This perspective 
provides a valuable way of analysing government reform because it recognises that 
logics are plural.  Thus, reform can be conceptualised as a process of contestation 
resulting from the agency of strategic actors.  Our central argument has two elements.  
First, that public bodies’ reform exposes a clash between the centrifugal ‘logic of 
discipline’ that rationalises the delegation of governmental roles and the centripetal 
‘logic of democracy’ that requires politicians to exercise due authority.  Secondly, it 
stimulates contestation between deeper logics within the machinery of the state – 
between legislature and executive, and government’s corporate centre and its 
departments.  These zones of contestation are analysed drawing on a rich qualitative 
data set.  We conclude that institutional logics offer new insights into the wider politics 
of governmental reform. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper analyses the early years of the UK’s Coalition government in respect of one 
aspect of its desire to reshape the organisational landscape of government in England – 
the reform of arm’s length public bodies (‘quangos’).  Our central argument has two 
elements.  First, that this reform programme exposes a clash of institutional logics 
between the centrifugal ‘logic of discipline’ that rationalises the delegation of 
governmental roles to enlightened experts (Roberts 2010) and the centripetal ‘logic of 
democracy’ that requires politicians to exercise due authority over and accountability 
for public functions.  But secondly, we see public bodies’ reform as an epiphenomenon, 
analysis of which reveals two deeper tensions within the machinery of the state – 
between legislature and executive, and between government’s corporate centre and its 
departments.  We employ the literature on institutional logics to tease apart and 
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understand these governing dilemmas.  Our argument is not so much that the existence 
of these tensions is either new or novel to the United Kingdom – a vast body of 
scholarship focuses on the problems of delegation, autonomy and control within public 
governance (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2003; Talbot and Pollitt 2004; Verhoest et al. 2011) 
– but that (1) scholars need new analytical tools and methods of exposing and analysing 
these tensions; and (2) when applied these new tools reveal the manner in which the 
Coalition government’s approach to statecraft is developing. 
 
There is a large body of research on the delegation of functions and the potential 
pathologies of attempting to ‘govern at a distance’ (i.e. through arm’s-length bodies of 
one form or another). The constitutional configuration of the American political system 
has, for example, spawned a huge literature on agency problems (e.g. Bertelli 2012; 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002) and the evolution of governance 
within Europe has fuelled a related body of work on non-majoritarian institutions, 
democratic deficits and credibility-dilemmas (e.g. Elgie 2006; Flinders 2010; Thatcher 
and Stone Sweet 2002). These literatures therefore focus attention on the centrifugal 
thrust of dominant reform paradigms and their impact in terms of ‘unravelling’, 
‘unbundling’ or ‘hollowing-out’ the state.  The literature on the converse centripetal 
logic is less explicit in terms of an attachment to the analysis of delegation, but does 
highlight the existence of a centralising dynamic within democratic governance.  The 
most extensive is on political responsibility in general, and ministerial accountability in 
particular, and explores the conditions under which politicians have an obligation to 
take some personal responsibility for the activities of arm’s-length bodies and the 
appointees who run them, however tenuous that might be in reality. Such obligations 
often come into play during legitimacy crises where arm’s length bodies are somehow 
seen to fail or underperform, and  politicians emerge as ‘lightning rods’ for social 
outrage, discontent or angst, often irrespective of whether the source of concern 
offered any element of political control. This connects to Jonsen’s discussion of the ‘rule 
of rescue’ in healthcare: ‘Our moral response to the imminence of death demands that 
we rescue the doomed.  We throw a rope to the drowning, rush into burning buildings 
to snatch the entrapped, dispatch teams to search for the snowbound’ (Jonsen, 1986, 
172). What Jonsen terms the ‘rescue mortality’ is arguably synonymous with the 
imperative on politicians to interfere in or take back control of delegated functions.  
 
The tension between maintaining some element of political control within a democratic 
polity on the one hand, while facilitating managerial flexibility, judicial discretion or 
expert judgement on the other, is therefore a critical element of modern governance.  
But this tension does not play out in isolation, as much of the literature in this field 
tends to imply.  The Coalition government’s public bodies’ reform programme is located 
in and interacts with a wider political and governmental landscape, and thus provides a 
valuable window through which to explore and tease apart the broader and competing 
institutional logics.  We structure our discussion in the following way. First, we provide a 
context to the world of arm’s-length bodies and the episodic demands for a ‘bonfire of 
the quangos’.  This leads into a theoretical discussion of institutional logics and their 
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potential for enhancing the analysis of government.  We follow this with empirical 
material on the three tensions, and use these to develop findings in relation to the 
empirical case and the application of an institutional logics approach to problems of 
government and politics.   
 
ARM’S LENGTH BODIES AND THE IMPERATIVES FOR REFORM 
 
Arm’s length bodies come in many forms.  In the English context they include non-
departmental public bodies, executive agencies, public corporations, non-ministerial 
departments, public-private partnerships, and a large number of sub-national single 
purpose bodies delivering health, education, economic regeneration and other 
functions.  Their common characteristic is that they are special purpose vehicles created 
to enable public policy to be formulated and/or delivered with a degree of autonomy 
from elected political principals, or to bring together experts to offer independent 
advice to politicians, or to exercise lay judgement in administrative tribunals (Flinders 
1999).  There is a long-standing definitional problem in this field of study, as the variety 
of terms employed above illustrates.  In this paper we are concerned specifically with 
the Coalition government’s ‘public bodies’ reform, which applies to organisations 
officially classified as executive, advisory or tribunal non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs) together with a smaller number of public corporations and non-ministerial 
departments (Cabinet Office 2012c).  Hereinafter, we use the term ‘public bodies’ to 
refer to this group of organisations. 
 
Such public bodies are colloquially referred to as ‘quangos’, a term with largely 
pejoratively connotations associated with political patronage in chair and non-executive 
appointments, boardroom extravagance, lack of good stewardship of public resources, 
poor transparency, limited accountability, and a host of other characteristics deemed 
undesirable for governmental bodies (Skelcher 1998).  Nevertheless, they have proved 
an irresistible mechanism for UK governments dating back a considerable time, who 
have found them advantageous by virtue of their role in discharging public functions at 
a distance from ministers (Flinders 2008).   
 
Since the mid 1970s, there have been episodic campaigns by individual MPs, political 
parties, the press, and pressure groups to reduce the number, role and autonomy of 
quangos, and a number of governments have also launched reform initiatives.  The main 
points of reform prior to that of the Coalition government are as follows.  In 1979 the 
incoming 1979 Thatcher administration commissioned Sir Leo Pliatzky, a senior civil 
servant, to undertake a comprehensive cataloguing and review of NDPBs, public 
corporations and other arm’s length bodies across Whitehall (Pliatzky 1980).  The 
government accepted his recommendations and closed a large number of advisory 
bodies, abolished some executive bodies, and also undertook a limited programme of 
merger and transfer of functions.  The next major set of reforms was in the mid 1990s, 
in response to public concern about patronage and poor standards of public conduct.   
An early report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life resulted in a number of 
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changes to the governance of public bodies, but did not address the question of the size 
or cost of the appointed state.  Some reforms were undertaken by the first Blair 
administration, but in the context of that government’s widespread creation of arm’s 
length bodies of various forms.   Reports by the Public Administration Select Committee 
at the end of the 1990s/early 2000s again highlighted problems of accountability and 
governance, but no significant reforms were proposed for public bodies operating in 
England or England plus other parts of the UK 1 until the closing months of the Brown 
administration in 2009/10 (HM Treasury 2010).  Separate reviews and reforms were 
undertaken by the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
during the 2000s (e.g. Birrell 2008).   
 
In the 2010 general election campaign the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
parties all committed to reform of quangos and this was subsequently written into the 
Coalition agreement.  The new government then launched the cross-Whitehall Public 
Bodies Review led by Francis Maude MP, Minister for the Cabinet Office.  The Review 
was conducted over the summer 2010, and covered 263 types of non-departmental 
public bodies, public corporations and non-ministerial departments – over 900 bodies in 
total.2 The background to and conduct of the review has been discussed in depth 
elsewhere (Flinders and Skelcher 2012; Gash, et al. 2010), and we provide further detail 
in the empirical sections later in this paper.  In essence, the proposed that 
approximately 500 public bodies would be reformed to some degree, with 199 
abolished and a further 120 merged. 
 
The Coalition government’s public bodies’ reform provides an ideal empirical focus for 
our analysis for three reasons.  First, arm’s length bodies embody the tension between 
control and autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2010).  They are created in order that political 
principals can delegate functions to them, thus placing these functions at a distance 
from ministers, but at the same time they are accountable to ministers and, in some 
cases, Parliament and other bodies for the exercise of these functions.  Thus a 
government’s approach to arm’s length bodies tells us something about the relationship 
between centripetal and centrifugal logics.  Secondly, the Coalition’s reforms have been 
highly contested in and beyond Parliament.  The passage of the Public Bodies Bill 
generated (and continues to generate) an unusually large number of select committee 
inquiries, it took much longer than anticipated, and it emerged having undergone 
significant amendment.  Thirdly, the reform of public bodies is associated with a wider 
set of changes in the relationship between the centre of government, particularly the 
Cabinet Office, and policy departments.  There has been an attempt to centralise 
control of spending by departments and their public bodies, to rationalise departments’ 
sponsorship relationships with their public bodies, and to control the management of 
information.  These three changes destabilise the temporary settlement between 
competing institutional logics and thus open up points of contestation.  We now turn to 
the literature on institutional logics to show the ways in which this can add value to our 
analysis. 
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INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
The concept of institutional logics emerged within the field of institutional theory, and 
especially its concern in recent decades to explain social action in terms of cultural 
norms and cognitive structures.  There is now a considerable empirical literature 
employing institutional logics as an analytical and explanatory device, but principally in 
studies of business organisations undertaken within the organisational sociology and 
management fields.  There has been relatively little application of this approach in the 
political science discipline, nor the wider public or not-for-profit domains, although 
there are some exceptions.  These include Meyer and Hammerschmid’s (2006) analysis 
of the reform of Austrian public bureaucracies, Mullins (2006) discussion of change in 
housing association governance, and Saz-Carranza and Longo (2012) on public-private 
partnerships.  However we think it has considerable potential because it understands 
the world as one in which there is contestation as actors seeks to renegotiate the 
tensions between logics. 
 
The institutional logics approach is located squarely within the context of institutional 
theory and institutional analysis.  Phillip Selznik and Talcott Parsons originally argued 
that institutions functioned through universalistic rules, contracts and authority.  A 
second phase of development – led by scholars including John Meyer, Brian Rowan and 
Lynne Zucker – highlighted the role of culture and cognition in institutional analysis.  
More specifically this phase emphasized the role of modernization in rationalizing 
previously informal rules and operating procedures. An externally imposed model of 
rationality was therefore depicted and processes of isomorphism were theorised, 
notably by DiMaggio and Powell. The final decade of the twentieth century witnessed a 
third phase of institutional analysis – led by Roger Friedland, Roger Alford, Richard Scott 
and others – that posited institutional logics as defining the content and meaning of 
institutions.  The focus of organisational analysis therefore shifted away from 
isomorphism and rationality towards exposing and understanding the effects of 
differentiated institutional logics in a variety of contexts. 
 
The term institutional logics was first coined by Friedland and Alford to describe the 
contradictory practices and beliefs inherent in the institutions of modern western 
societies.  Their research argued that the organisations of capitalism, state bureaucracy 
and political democracy were forged upon three contending institutional logics which, in 
turn, shaped the practises and beliefs of the individuals working within those sphere 
and how they interpreted specific threats and opportunities. Institutional logics 
therefore matter because they shape both individual and organisational behaviour 
through providing social actors with a set of principles, with a vocabulary of motive and 
a sense of identity within an increasingly fluid social milieu. Institutional logics also 
provide individuals, groups and organisations with resources – in the form of a common 
or legitimating narrative of self and value – that can be deployed as a cultural resource 
to either facilitate or obfuscate transformation or reform. This is a critical point from the 
perspective of political science as institutional logics effectively become contested 
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interpretations of ‘the rules of the game’ and, as Friedland and Alford (1991) emphasize, 
are available to individuals, groups and organizations to further elaborate, manipulate 
and use to their own advantage.  Since institutional logics are plural, they are therefore 
the arena for intra and inter-organisational power struggles as individuals and groups 
seek to change their content and the relationship between them. However, as 
Greenwood et al (2010) argue, this central political feature of the concept of 
institutional logic has not been sufficiently exploited, with most attention being devoted 
to structuring by a dominant logic, and thus its isomorphic effects.    
 
The salience of institutional logics in the analysis of government reform arises because 
of this recognition that logics are differentiated or plural.  In other words, reform can be 
conceptualised as a process of adjustment at the boundary between two or more 
institutional logics, and thus is a process of contestation, although this important 
implication is sometimes not expressly recognised in the literature.  This provides a clear 
link to the empirical focus of our paper but it also highlights the manner in which 
institutional logics are not simply sets of shared cultural concerns but are also logics of 
action or inaction. This is a critical point. Institutional logics provide conceptions or 
models of what is ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ at any 
particular time or in any given relationship.  This is more than just a return to the notion 
of institutional isomorphism, however, since this underplays the contestation that is 
inherent in a world of plural institutional logics.  What the institutional logics approach 
adds is this focus on contestation and agency at particular moments (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008). 
 
Our analysis posits three specific zones of contestation (table 1).  First, there is 
contestation between the logic of greater political control over and improved 
accountability by public bodies, and the logic of delegation to and autonomy by such 
arm’s length agencies.  However, what this paper’s analysis of the public bodies reform 
programme reveals is the interplay between the contestation around these logics and 
two further zones of contestation. This is a critical point. To date, the analysis of 
delegation and control has primarily focused on the relationship between political 
principals and arm’s-length bodies. We argue that this needs to be seen in the wider 
context of the second zone of contestation between the logic of the legislature as the 
protector and guarantor of constitutional principles, and the logic of executive 
ministerial authority especially in the context of a new government and a perceived 
crisis; and a third zone of contestation between the logic of a more centralised approach 
to the organisation and management of government, and that of departmental 
responsibility.   
 
  
 7 
 
Table 1 Zones of Contestation in Public Bodies’ Reform 
 
ZONE LEVEL TENSION FOCUS ACTORS 
1.Executive Micro-level The tension emanating 
from ministerial 
attempts to impose 
greater coordinative 
and control capacity 
while at the same time 
seeking to delegate 
functions to public 
bodies and other 
agencies.. 
Transfer of 
functions; 
creation of 
new public 
bodies; 
reviewing 
bodies 
Ministers and 
departmental 
sponsor 
teams; public 
body boards 
2.Constitutional  Macro-
political  
Contestation between 
the reassertion of 
legislature, as the 
protector and 
guarantor of 
constitutional 
principles, and the 
executive where the 
latter wishes to 
implement rapid and 
significant reforms to 
the machinery of 
government and 
governance. 
Ministerial 
authority; 
Parliamentary 
scrutiny; pre-
emption of 
parliament 
Legislature 
and executive 
3.Governmental  Mid-range  Contestation between 
the development of a 
more centralised 
approach to the 
organisation and 
management of 
government in 
contrast to a tradition 
rooted in pragmatic 
departmentalism. 
Impetus for 
reform; cross-
Whitehall 
controls; 
approach to 
sponsorship 
of public 
bodies 
Central 
departments 
and policy 
departments  
 
 
ANALYSING CONTESTATION IN THE REFORM OF ARM’S LENGTH BODIES 
 
The three zones of contestation are examined using data gathered from an extensive 
programme of interviewing, document analysis and observation between January and 
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December 2012.  Working with the Cabinet Office Public Bodies team and the Public 
Chairs Forum, we were able to negotiate high level access across Whitehall and with 
individual public bodies.  Interviews were undertaken by the authors with 32 senior civil 
servants from across Whitehall, 23 chairs and chief executives of public bodies, 14 MPs 
and Lords, and four representatives of other organisations with specific interests in 
arm’s length governance.  Interviews were face-to-face or by telephone, recorded, and 
fully transcribed or compiled into field notes.  In addition, we observed and were invited 
to contribute to a number of internal meetings, workshops and conferences both in 
Whitehall and within the public chairs network. Our research drew on relevant 
documentary sources, including government statements about and proposals for public 
bodies’ reform, Hansard and select committee reports, reports from the National Audit 
Office and Institute for Government, and various working papers. 
 
Data were collected on the origins and goals of reform, the involvement of and 
relationships between actors, stages in the reform process, approaches to and 
outcomes of strategising, and consequences for the functioning of government, public 
bodies themselves, and Parliament.  This enabled us to document the public bodies’ 
reform process from the pre-election manifesto preparation stage in mid 2009 to the 
publication of the Government’s update on progress in December 2012.  Within this, we 
were able to distil out the main lines of contestation, and thus to construct the three 
pairs of institutional logics that we present below.  Our analysis has been scrutinised by 
our advisory group, which contains academics in the field together with policy actors 
from the major organisations/sectors involved, and through more frequent and detailed 
discussion with key informants.  In addition, we have used these data to provide written 
and oral evidence to two select committee enquiries, thus exposing our work to 
additional scrutiny.  These processes give us confidence that we have a credible 
understanding of the politics of the reform process and thus a solid empirical basis from 
which to develop the analysis contained in this paper, to which we now turn through a 
consideration of each of the zones of contestation.   
 
Executive contestation: political control or delegation to boards?  
 
The central zone of contestation is between the competing logics of political control and 
delegation to public bodies; in essence, where does executive authority lie?  The former 
logic posits that key government functions must be under direct political control if the 
demands of representative democratic accountability are to be met.  It is argued that 
arm’s length bodies are unaccountable because of their distance from ministerial 
control, and therefore rectifying this problem involves moving the functions undertaken 
by these bodies back in to government departments which are more directly under the 
remit of ministers.  This logic was overtly evident in the Government discourse 
surrounding the public bodies' reform programme, with Prime Minister David Cameron 
commenting prior to his election in 2009: 
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I’m convinced that the growth of the quango state is one of the main reasons so 
many people feel that nothing ever changes; nothing will ever get done and that 
government’s automatic response to any problem is to pass the buck and send 
people from pillar to post until they just give up in exasperated fury’ (Cameron, 
2009). 
 
Minister for the Cabinet Office Francis Maude re-iterated this commitment to increasing 
accountability through public bodies reform when, in a speech in June 2010, he stated 
that ‘we are committed to cutting the number of public bodies to increase 
accountability and cut costs’ (HC Deb, 9 Jun 2010, c. 313; emphasis added).  The 
centrality of increasing political control to the public bodies reform agenda was again 
stated in the Cabinet Office Public Bodies 2012 report, where it was argued that ‘overall 
responsibility for public functions should rest with democratically-elected ministers’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2012d). 
 
However, the public bodies reform agenda did not aim for the abolition of all forms of 
arm’s length governance; rather, it set out a number of conditions under which a public 
body could be permitted to continue to exist.  Passing one of the following three tests 
would mean that a public body would not be abolished, but rather may continue to exist 
in its current, or in a reformed, form:  
1. Does the quango undertake a precise technical operation? 
2. Is it necessary for impartial decisions to be made about the distribution of 
taxpayers’ money?  
3. Does it fulfil a need for facts to be transparently determined, independent of 
political interference? (Cameron, 2009) 
The claim that a public body should continue to fulfil key functions of government rests 
on the institutional logic of delegation.  This logic assumes that functions should be 
delegated to arm’s length bodies because some require a certain degree of 
independence from government, or perform a specific technical function which may be 
carried out more efficiently and effectively at arm’s length. 
 
The tension between these institutional logics is apparent in three areas of policy 
debate.   The first of these relates to the transfer of functions.  The reform plans 
demonstrate that the Government is abolishing arm’s length bodies and is moving 
functions closer in to Government – for example moving functions into departments, or 
transferring them to executive agencies which in theory sit closer to government.  In all, 
nine functions have been transferred to executive agencies, and sixteen into 
departments.3 In moving functions under the more direct control of departments, the 
reform agenda appears to perpetuate the institutional logic of ministerial control. 
However, in reality the number of functions being brought ‘back in’ to government is 
relatively small, with the bulk of functions from abolished bodies being transferred to 
other arm’s length bodies.  57% of the functions of abolished bodies being continued in 
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whole or in part by other such organisations4, and £43.2 billion of public expenditure 
remain at arm’s length despite the purported aim of the reforms to bring functions back 
under government control (National Audit Office, 2012).  Further, for functions which 
are brought back into departments when arm’s length bodies are abolished, the 
designation of responsibility and accountability is complex.  For example, where 
regulatory functions have been brought back into departments, our research suggests 
that it has sometimes required ‘Chinese walls’ to be created in order to ensure the 
separation of responsibility for advice and decision-making at official and ministerial 
level.  This is particularly the case where functions carry specific regulatory or inspection 
powers, and therefore require a degree of critical distance from the department and 
from Ministers. 
 
The second area of policy debate relates to the creation of new public bodies.  The 
creation of new bodies is an embodiment of the institutional logic of delegation, and 
indeed the birth of new bodies has occurred since the Coalition Government came to 
power in 2010, albeit to a more limited extent.  For example, the Social Mobility and 
Child Poverty Commission, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact and the 
National Employment Savings Trust are all NDPBs which have been created since the 
Coalition came to power.  Looking further than those bodies formally classified as 
NDPBs reveals other types of arm’s length bodies which have been created under the 
Coalition Government.  For example, four new executive agencies have been created in 
the in the Department for Education5, as well as the Legal Aid Agency and the National 
Crime Agency.  These new bodies have changed status from NDPB to executive agency 
without any changes to their functions, but it is argued that such executive agencies are 
closer in to ministers and thus more subject to control and accountability. 
 
Such creations suggest the continuing relevance of arm’s length bodies, and 
demonstrate that the institutional logic of delegation is apparent in the approach taken 
by the Coalition Government.  However, this logic is clearly strongly contested by the 
logic of political control which is driving the abolition of NDPBs across Government, and 
is also embodied in a climate where proposals to create new arm’s length bodies are 
seen as undesirable.  Guidance issued by the Government on the creation of NDPBs 
suggests that they are to be considered as a last resort: 
 
It is stated Government policy that new NDPBs will only be set up as a last resort, 
when consideration of all other delivery mechanisms have been exhausted, and 
that approval for setting up a new NDPB must be sought formally from Cabinet 
Office Ministers before any decision, or announcement, about any NDPB is made 
(Cabinet Office, 2012a, 4). 
 
Such a strong aversion to creating NDPBs serves to reinforce the institutional logic of 
political control underpinning the abolition of NDPBs by attempting to ensure that the 
number of NDPBs does not mushroom in the future.  This feeds into the final policy 
debate, which concerns the legacy of public bodies’ reform.  In both the desire to cast 
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NDPBs as the ‘last resort’ in the delivery of government functions, and the 
implementation of a programme of ‘triennial reviews’, it is apparent that a logic of 
political control is guiding the way in which the legacy of public bodies reform is being 
shaped. 
 
Triennial reviews are reviews of public bodies which are undertaken by departments for 
each of their bodies every three years.  These reviews are designed first to question 
whether there is still a justification for the body to continue to exist.  If the answer is 
yes, then the second stage is a review of the corporate governance of the body, to 
ensure that it is being run effectively and efficiently (Cabinet Office, 2011a).  The 
existential nature of the reviews reflects a desire to enhance the logic of ministerial 
control; however, to date these reviews have focused on small, non-contentious bodies 
and to date none have recommended the abolition of the body in question.  Rather, in 
recommending their continued existence, these reviews can serve to embody the logic 
of delegation after the initial phase of public bodies’ reform. 
 
This is evident more widely in the way in which the public bodies’ reform agenda is 
being increasingly recast away from abolition.  The Cabinet Office Public Bodies Team 
has been relocated to the ‘Transformation Cluster’ under new Minister for Civil Society 
Nick Hurd MP, together with other work of the Cabinet Office which emphasises 
alternative business models for NDPBs, such as mutualisation, as ways of delivering cost 
reductions.  While the extent to which these models will be taken up by NDPBs remains 
unclear, given to date that only one public body – British Waterways – has been 
mutualised (into the Canal and River Trust), the emphasis being placed on these 
alternative models once again demonstrates that abolishing and reforming NDPBs has 
not led to the demise of arm’s length governance in general. 
 
The emphasis of this institutional logic dovetails with the civil service reform plan (HM 
Government, 2012) in driving forward efficiency through alternative models of service 
delivery.  The public bodies reform agenda largely developed independently of the civil 
service reform agenda, and it does appear that the logic of political control 
underpinning the former clashes with the logic of delegation that is embodied in the 
latter.  However, given the analysis presented here which has demonstrated the 
endurance of the delegation logic, the two may have far more in common than first 
appearances would suggest. 
 
Constitutional contestation: Parliamentary authority or ministerial discretion? 
 
Beyond this central clash of institutional logics, we discern two other zones of 
contestation.  The first involves the constitutional tension between parliamentary 
authority and ministerial discretion.  Since the 2010 general election the Coalition 
government have advanced their programme of public bodies’ reform and intend to 
have abolished 300 bodies by 2015. A number of these changes are contained in the 
Public Bodies Act 2011, which was introduced into the Lords in October 2010.  The 
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passage of the Bill is of interest here as it exhibits key debates about the powers and 
duties of ministers in relation to the authority of Parliament, exposing underlying 
contestation between what can be termed a ‘parliamentary’ and a ‘ministerial’ 
institutional logic.  
 
The Westminster model of government gives rise to these logics as it is founded upon 
the idea that the executive (and ministers therein) initiate policy and exercise powers 
either gained by prerogative or granted by statute in order to govern the State. Far from 
wielding these powers unfettered, ministers are held accountable by the Houses of 
Parliament who scrutinise, challenge and can amend or forestall legislation; allowing 
Parliament to exercise a degree of influence over the legislative process. As Blackburn 
and Kennon argue, the Westminster Model is founded upon a tension whereby ‘If bills 
are not passed, new policies cannot be implemented. And, as bills require parliamentary 
approval, there is no way governments can avoid the parliamentary struggle’ (2003, 
p.5). In this manner the British political system exhibits an inherent rivalry between the 
ministerial logic of policy formation and implementation, and the parliamentary logic of 
authorization and scrutiny which can place pressure on, amend and even derail 
ministerial policies.  
 
Whilst at conflict these two logics are held in check by several mechanisms and 
conventions which ensure that deadlock cannot emerge between the two parties. For 
example, whilst Parliament formally holds the cabinet to account, as Lijphart reflects, ‘In 
reality, the relationship is reversed. Because the cabinet is composed of leaders of a 
cohesive majority party in the House of Commons, it is normally backed by the majority 
in the House of Commons, and it can confidently count on staying in office and getting 
its legislative proposals approved’ (2012, p.12). In addition more formal powers such as 
the Parliament Act 1911 (and later 1949) removed the Lords’ power to reject money 
Bills and veto ordinary public Bills, replacing this with a power of delay for a maximum 
of two years following second reading in the Commons. Such provisions allow the 
executive to force through legislation in the face of parliamentary opposition, ensuring 
that ministers maintain a degree of control over legislation (Baldwin, 2005, p.11). 
 
Recognising the tension between ministers’ desire to initiate and embark on new 
programmes of reform, and Parliament’s desire to protect constitutional principles and 
ensure measured change is of great value when seeking to understand the passage of 
the Public Bodies Bill as in this case three areas of conflict can be detected. First it is 
possible to discern conflict over the scope of this Bill. In Parliament Francis Maude 
presented an ambitious reform programme and clear statements of intent, asserting:   
 
Today, the Government have taken decisive action to restore accountability and 
responsibility to public life. For too long, this country has tolerated Ministers 
who duck the difficult decisions they were elected to make. For too long, we 
have had too many people who were unaccountable, with a licence to meddle in 
people’s lives…The landscape for public bodies needs radical reform to increase 
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transparency and accountability, to cut out duplication of activity and to 
discontinue activities that are simply no longer needed. My written statement 
this morning outlined the start of a process to curtail the quango state. (HC Deb, 
14 October 2010, c505). 
 
Yet despite this intent ministers experienced significant resistance from Parliament, with 
members of the Commons and Lords highlighting concerns with the constitutional and 
policy implications of the bill. In presenting the Public Bodies Bill the government 
outlined seven schedules which, if passed, would convey considerable delegated power 
to ministers. In addition to seeking approval for specific reforms such as abolishing, 
merging or modifying bodies’ constitutional arrangements, ministers also included the, 
now infamous, schedule 7. This provision would have conveyed significant Henry VIII 
powers to government, allowing ministers to reform bodies in an unspecified manner at 
a future date. Accordingly it would become possible for ministers to abolish or 
dramatically reform bodies whose creation had been the subject of significant 
parliamentary debate without recourse to Parliament. These powers aligned with 
ministerial logic and the desire for sweeping reform, but they were in stark 
contravention of parliamentary logic as they bypassed parliamentary scrutiny – 
removing the check on government behaviour. In reaction to these proposals Baroness 
Royall, Shadow leader of the Lords branded the public bodies bill ‘badly thought out, 
badly structured, badly executed, bad for the constitution, bad for public bodies and 
bad for government’ (HL Deb, 9 Nov 2010, c. 68). Accordingly significant opposition was 
mobilised in the Lords, resulting in the removal of schedule 7, and the amendment of 
several government proposals (either by saving bodies by removing them from the Bill 
entirely – as in the case of the Youth Justice Board and Chief Coroner - or amending 
scheduling). This represented a significant challenge to ministerial authority, exhibiting 
Parliament’s capacity to hold the executive to check.  
 
The fundamental question of ministerial authority posed in debates on this Bill has 
continued to be aired since it gained Royal Assent. This is apparent in a second conflict 
concerning statutory instruments and parliamentary consideration of orders brought 
forward under the Public Bodies Act. In the passage of the Bill an amendment was 
passed which allowed for an enhanced scrutiny procedure to be triggered by the 
Committee charged with reporting on public bodies orders (the Merits Committee) or 
by the House itself. This provision allowed Parliament the opportunity to subject 
ministerial plans to greater scrutiny and call the minister responsible to justify plans in 
greater detail. However, the minister has no requirement to implement committee 
recommendations and can submit the order in its original form for approval by a 
resolution of each House of Parliament. The absence of a parliamentary veto over 
orders therefore significantly weakens the ability of the Lords to inhibit ministerial 
authority.6  
 
As at 1st March 2013 19 draft orders (relating to 37 public bodies) have been laid before 
Parliament and all have been approved, having first been considered by the relevant 
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departmental select committee in the Commons and the House of Lords Secondary 
Legislation Scrutiny Committee (House of Lords, 2012, p.3). In large part the order 
making process has been uncontentious. Thus far the enhanced affirmative procedure 
has been triggered in three cases, with the Secondary Legislative Scrutiny Committee 
once calling in the minister to give oral evidence, and once making formal 
recommendations. These have focused on four issues: the quality of evidence justifying 
the proposed order, a failure to make the case for reform, the minister’s decision not to 
put the proposal out for public consultation, and the monitoring and scrutiny of future 
arrangements. Whilst some evidence of good practice has been noted the Committee 
has concluded that ‘In a few instances, the explanatory material provided with the draft 
order may have given rise to an impression that the Department concerned viewed the 
public bodies order process as a rubber stamping mechanism; and we have sought to 
challenge such assumptions’ (House of Lords, 2012, p.12). Such outcomes suggest 
ongoing tensions over parliamentary and ministerial logics.  
 
The third conflict concerns the pre-emption of Parliament. In the aftermath of the Bill 
members of the Lords have turned their attention to consider whether ministers have 
exceeded their authority in relation to – amongst other things – public bodies reform by 
beginning to reform bodies prior to legislative scrutiny and approval. The House of Lords 
Committee on the Constitution has initiated an enquiry into the ‘pre-emption of 
Parliament’ in order to establish whether there are guidelines on the extent to which 
ministers can initiate change in advance of legislation. Although their report is not yet 
published, the evidence sessions reveal ambiguity as to the extent to which ministers 
can act in advance of parliamentary approval. Whilst certain ministerial conventions 
such as the 1932 concordat and the Ram Doctrine guide behaviour, it is by no means 
transparent when pre-emptive organisational change is constitutionally appropriate.7 
Accordingly the tension between Parliament and the executive remains in evidence.  
 
Departmental contestation: Centralising control or sustaining departmentalism? 
 
A final dimension of contestation between institutional logics in relation to the Coalition 
government’s public bodies’ reform programme is between the competing logics of 
centralisation and departmentalism.  On the one hand, control over the public bodies 
landscape is seen to be exerted by the ‘centre’ – that is, the Cabinet Office and the 
Treasury; a dynamic which we will term the institutional logic of centralisation.  On the 
other hand, departments continue to exert control over the arm’s length bodies within 
their jurisdiction, a theme we term the institutional logic of departmentalism.  Once 
again, our analysis highlights three areas of debate with regards to these logics. 
 
The first area of contention relates to the underlying impetus for the reform and 
abolition of public bodies since 2010.  The implementation of the Public Bodies Reform 
Programme has been led through a dedicated team at the Cabinet Office, under the 
leadership of Minister for the Cabinet Office, Francis Maude.  As we noted earlier, 
Maude shaped this programme of reform according to goals of increasing the 
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accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the public bodies landscape.  The 
leadership of Maude and the Cabinet Office team has been central to realising the 
abolition and reform of bodies.  The team has ensured the full implementation of the 
reform programme within departments, working with departments through a Public 
Bodies Working Group and Strategy Board, and monitoring the extent of abolition and 
reform through the regular reporting of statistics related to the implementation of the 
programme.  It is clear that, from the perspective of the centre, the abolition and reform 
of public bodies has been conceived of, steered and monitored by the Cabinet Office, 
and this points towards a logic of centralisation. 
 
However, from our extensive research in departments, it has become increasingly 
apparent that the public bodies’ reform programme was not the only agenda driving 
these changes.  Specifically, due to government’s commitments to a programme of 
deficit reduction, departments have faced challenging budgets which have changed the 
ways in which they manage key functions.  For example, following the 2010 spending 
review DCMS faced a departmental budget cut of 30%.  While, of course, the decision to 
cut this budget stemmed from the Treasury, it was up to the department itself to decide 
in which areas resources should be cut.  In DCMS, along with a number of other 
departments, the need to make substantial savings has driven the reform of public 
bodies and changes to the ways in which those that remain are governed.  Therefore, 
while the key headline of a Cabinet Office-driven ‘bonfire of the quangos’ suggests a 
logic of centralisation underpinning the approach to public bodies reform taken by the 
Government, the extent to which departmental decision-making over public bodies 
reform rests on the need to reduce resources due to budget cuts suggests a less overt 
but nonetheless competing logic of departmentalism. 
 
The second line of debate concerns the ‘spending controls framework’ which has been 
implemented by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury.  This framework was quickly 
introduced when the Coalition Government came to power as part of a desire to 
improve the control of spending across central government, and has a significant impact 
on the actions of public bodies, covering spending on advertising, consultancy, IT, 
procurement and the hiring of new staff (Cabinet Office 2012b; Institute for 
Government 2012).  Some are set by the Treasury, and others are set by the 
Departmental Engagement section of the Cabinet Office.  In addition, the Cabinet Office 
and the Treasury have increased the amount of data that public bodies must regularly 
provide, including the publication of all salaries over £150,000, and all spending over 
£25,000. 
 
These controls have significant influence over the day to day autonomy of public bodies, 
and indeed some have expressed concern that they inhibit the effective working of 
public bodies, particularly where they are involved in significant commercial activities 
(Institute for Government, 2012).  Yet the Government has made clear that the controls 
framework is a permanent addition to the public bodies’ governance architecture, and 
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this represents a strong commitment to the institutional logic of centralisation, whereby 
the Cabinet Office and Treasury exert significant control over public bodies. 
 
Yet still, within this controls framework, there is also a significant part for departments 
to play.  For lower level spending, it is at the discretion of the department to impose 
controls on spending as it sees fit – once again reflecting the apparent dependence of 
changes to the governance of public bodies on departmental resources, rather than on 
the public bodies reform agenda per se.  Departmental discretion in setting financial 
controls demonstrates further complexities in the notion that the institutional logic of 
centralisation is driving the controls framework, and highlights an institutional logic of 
departmentalism in the delegation of core tasks related to this framework to the 
departmental level.  Further, the intersection of Cabinet Office, Treasury and 
departmental controls has led to some challenges for public bodies in understanding 
lines of accountability and to whom they should turn for a particular application for 
spending; in itself, this demonstrates both the co-existence and the contestation 
between centralisation and departmentalism in the implementation of the spending 
controls framework. 
 
Finally, a third line of dispute is apparent in the sponsorship of arm’s length bodies, 
meaning the day to day management of the relationship between a department and its 
arm’s length bodies.  Here, the logic of centralisation is apparent in the steps taken by 
the Cabinet Office to develop centrally-led principles of good sponsorship against an 
historic record of poor sponsorship performance (see Flinders, 2008 for details).  These 
principles were intended to be informed by Cabinet Office classifications, meaning that 
different classes of public bodies would each receive the same form of sponsorship 
relationship.  Further, the Cabinet Office is also in the process of developing a ‘civil 
service learning pathway’ for sponsorship skills, intended to drive the 
professionalization and standard of sponsorship across Government.  An additional 
dynamic of the centralisation logic in this area concerns the implementation of the 
aforementioned triennial reviews, which are led by the Cabinet Office and demonstrate 
the centre taking an active interest in the governance of arm’s length bodies. 
 
However these dynamics can be contrasted against a conflicting logic of 
departmentalism.  While corporate principles of good sponsorship were sought, it 
quickly became apparent that the departments themselves took the view that 
sponsorship should be enacted in different ways for different bodies, according to 
different needs.  There has also been an emphasis by departments on learning from 
‘best practice’, rather than ‘developing a common, centrally-imposed skills set.   
 
CHALLENGES IN THE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 
 
The application of an institutional logics analysis casts light on the major cleavages in 
the Coalition government’s public bodies’ reform process.  It reveals that within the 
overall tension between the centrifugal force for autonomy and the centripetal force for 
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control lie two other zones of contestation – at constitutional and intra-governmental 
levels.  An understanding of the overall reform process thus involves an analysis of the 
specific politics of each of these zones.  Our analysis shows that the intention to reform 
an aspect of government thus stimulates pre-existing tensions between institutional 
logics.  Although rival institutional logics can be sustained over long periods of time 
through the creation of mechanisms of adjustment and accommodation, proposals for 
reform constitute a point where these mechanisms come under pressure and may 
ultimately falter or fail (Reay and Hinings 2009).  The politics of reform, therefore, must 
be understood as an epiphenomenon in relation to these deeper contestations.   
 
The institutional logics approach also helps explain the somewhat contradictory 
outcome of the legislative process, namely that the Bill to abolish a large number of 
quangos was significantly reduced in scope despite widespread public and political 
antipathy to these bodies.  As our interviews and the Hansard debates illustrate, what 
particularly exercised the Lords was the disruptive effect of the Bill’s provisions on the 
prevailing accommodation between parliamentary and ministerial logics.   It would have 
significantly shifted the weight towards the latter, and set a precedent for the future.  
Some Lords, of course, were opposed to the abolition of particular bodies whose work 
they valued, but in the main they emphasised the implications for the constitutional 
settlement.  Thus reform proposals need to be understood not just in their own terms, 
but as an expression of agency affecting institutional logics in the wider governmental 
and political system.  This presents a somewhat different approach to that taken by 
other widely used theoretical approaches to understanding governmental reform, for 
example those that emphasise policy windows and policy entrepreneurs, isomorphism 
in the search for legitimacy, or the advocacy coalition framework which stresses value 
congruence.  These approaches underplay the wider institutional tensions within the 
governmental system and the way in which reform dislodges temporary settlements 
that may have been reached. 
 
There are a number of more detailed theoretical and empirical questions that arise from 
applying the institutional logics approach to questions of politics and government.  A 
fundamental challenge is to extend our analysis into the debate about depoliticisation.  
This is a high level institutional logic that appears to operate over longer timescales that 
those with which we are concerned.  In addition, we need to know more about how 
institutional logics as a form of cultural capital can be deployed to prevent or facilitate 
governmental reform, thus opening up the politics of isomorphism to greater critical 
scrutiny by considering agencies’ strategies of resistance, adaption and compliance.  For 
example, a separate stream of work within this study has identified complex but 
strategically advantageous responses by some public bodies to the threat of reform.  
These include public bodies emphasising the importance of continuing the function 
undertaken by the organisation but not seeking to save the organisation itself.  In some 
cases this has secured a moderation of the proposed reform.  
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We also need to understand the way in which the promotion of and resistance to 
competing institutional logics take place in the discursive realm, and the place of 
discursive strategies in gaining advantage in the contest between logics.  Detailed 
analysis of utterances by actors in the reform of one public body is beginning to 
illuminate the way in which their timing, placement, and potential for amplification 
impact on the dominance of an institutional logic.   Finally, it is important to explore the 
role of social classification and bureaucratic categorization as a mechanism by which 
institutional logics shape individual and group cognition.  Changes in institutional logics 
can lead to the creation of new strategies and/or changes to the rules surrounding 
existing categories.  For example, the overtly technical process employed by the Office 
of National Statistics recently to reclassify further education and sixth form colleges 
from the government sector and into the non-profit sector has a wider consequence in 
terms of changing the social understanding of these types of organisation.  This 
technical process, therefore, conceals a significant resource in a wider political 
contestation between public, third sector and market logics. 
 
We have not had the space within this paper to explore the wider agenda of arm’s-
length body reform in England, especially its manifestations at sub-national level.  This 
includes the Department of Health’s complete restructuring of the NHS system, 
removing one set of sub-national arm’s length bodies (primary care trusts) and replacing 
them with another (clinical commissioning groups) as well as introducing health and 
well-being boards to formalise the relationship between the NHS and local government 
in relation to a range of interconnected responsibilities.  A number of other changes 
were also taking place which had the indirect effect of increasing the population of 
arm’s length bodies, for example with the promotion of academy and free schools as 
free-standing entities, although their private sponsorship and public financing places 
them in a somewhat unique position as a type of organisation.   These would benefit 
from the application of an institutional logics perspective to reveal their connection to 
deeper tensions in the governmental system.  Finally, this paper has focused on 
England.  Reform of quangos in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland pre-dates the 
reforms introduced by the Coalition government, and has not generally raised the same 
issues.  There is clearly the potential to develop this comparative aspect of the study of 
arm’s length body reform. 
 
 
Notes 
 
The authors acknowledge the financial support of ESRC research award ES/J010553/1 
‘Shrinking the State: Analysing the Reform of Arm’s-Length Bodies’.  The views 
expressed are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of respondents. 
 
1. Devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales during the 2000s meant that 
these devolved administrations were responsible for public bodies operating solely 
within their jurisdiction.  The UK government remained responsible for public bodies 
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operating either only in England (as there is no devolved administration this 
remaining part of the UK) or in England plus one or more of the other parts of the 
UK. 
2. Some types of public body contain multiple individual organisations each operating 
over a distinct geographical area – e.g. 8 x regional development agencies. 
3. Analysis of data contained in Cabinet Office (2011b).  Small numerical differences 
are due to bodies still under consideration and interpretation of proposals.  
4. As note 3. 
5. The Standards and Testing Agency replaced the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Development Agency; the Teaching Agency replaced the Training and Development 
Agency for Schools; the National College for School Leadership replaced the National 
College for Leadership of Schools and Children’s Services; and the Education Funding 
Agency replaced both the Young People’s Learning Agency and the Partnership for 
Schools. 
6. Orders to abolish or reform a small number of other public bodies are laid under 
departmental legislation that pre-dates the Public Bodies Act, and are not subject to 
the enhanced affirmative procedure. 
7. House of Lords Committee on the Constitution, ‘The Pre-emption of Parliament: Oral 
and Written Evidence’, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/preemption/PPEvidence.pdf, accessed 1st March 2013.  
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